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Convergence? 
Shubha Ghosh* 
The Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.1 is 
the most important pronouncement about the relationship 
between patent and competition policy since the Statute of 
Monopolies.2 Although it is hyperbole, the preceding statement 
also contains more than a kernel of truth. Through the Statute 
of Monopolies, the English Parliament established patents on 
inventions as an exception to the general prohibition against 
grants of monopoly privileges.3 The majority opinion in Actavis, 
authored by Justice Breyer, rejected a sharp separation 
between patent and antitrust laws—the position voiced in 
dissent by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas.4 The dissent rests on the assumption that antitrust 
and patent are distinct and largely non-overlapping bodies of 
law,5 an assumption that can be traced back to the Statute of 
Monopolies. Consequently, the majority opinion represents a 
reworking of the relationship between intellectual property law 
and antitrust. It may even signal a convergence of these two 
battling areas of law into a broader discourse of competition 
law and policy. But to end this paragraph on a low note, 
contrasting with the upbeat opening, it is unlikely that the 
Actavis opinion will have much influence beyond the narrow, 
but critical, confines of the Hatch-Waxman Act.6 That is 
unfortunate for competition law and policy. 
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 1. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 2. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac., c. 3 (Eng.). 
 3. Id. §§ 5–6. 
 4. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“A patent carves 
out an exception to the applicability of antitrust laws . . . . The [majority], 
however, departs from this approach . . . .”). 
 5. See id. 
 6. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
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Since participants in this symposium are well-versed in the 
facts of Actavis, I will not repeat them here. Instead, let me lay 
out a summary of the majority and dissenting opinions and a 
roadmap for my comments. The dissenting opinion is my 
starting point because it represents what I consider the 
traditional view of antitrust and patent law, as two competing 
rival statutory schemes. What I demonstrate is that the dissent 
represents a view going back to the Statute of Monopolies. 
What it ignores is the common law and statutory developments 
of patent and antitrust laws in the United States and the long 
standing conflict between exclusionary rights and legislative 
power, dating back to the Supreme Court chestnuts of Trustees 
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819),7 Gibbons v. Ogden 
(1824),8 and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837).9 For 
reasons of analytical convenience and forgetfulness about 
history, the patent-antitrust debate was reduced to convenient 
antipodes. Neither the twain shall meet, one hoped, but the two 
did meet through the poor draftsmanship of the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Now Justice Breyer’s majority opinion 
pragmatically sets the course straight by reminding us that 
patent law and antitrust law need to be considered together. 
The following comments flesh out these basic points. After 
presenting the idea of convergence as represented in the 
dissent and majority opinions in Actavis, I present the case for 
convergence of antitrust and patent law. My pessimistic 
conclusion is that, despite the need for convergence, intellectual 
property and antitrust will remain, under the terms of the 
Actavis decision, as dueling (and divided) fields except within 
the narrow area of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Tempering my 
pessimism is the suggestion that future litigants and future 
courts can press the case for convergence by cultivating the 
seeds that Justice Breyer has planted in his opinion. 
                                                          
 7. 17 U.S. 518, 712 (1819) (finding that the New Hampshire legislature 
lacked authority to impair the obligations of its charter to Dartmouth College); 
see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, 
at 32–33 (1991) (summarizing commentary on Dartmouth College). 
 8. 22 U.S. 1, 239–40 (1824) (finding New York laws regulating water 
navigation unconstitutional); see also PHILIP KURLAND, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND PATENTS AND MONOPOLIES, at ix (1975). 
 9. 36 U.S. 420, 551 (1837) (holding that the Charles River Bridge grant-
holders did not have exclusive rights). 
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I. PATENT & ANTITRUST 
From a pedagogical standpoint, the majority and 
dissenting opinions illustrate starkly the longstanding debate 
over the relationship between patent and antitrust. This 
section uses the dissenting and majority opinions, in that order, 
to comment on that debate and show how the Actavis opinion 
potentially leads us to a convergence of patent and antitrust 
under the broader umbrella of competition law. 
A. THE DISSENT AND ITS ROOTS 
“A patent carves out an exception to the applicability of 
antitrust laws.”10 In his now-familiar straightforward and 
pellucid writing style, Chief Justice Roberts presented the basis 
for his dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. As I 
explain below, the Chief explained the basis in policy for this 
exception and argued that the exception is deeply rooted in the 
Court’s precedent. Through this straightforward language, the 
Chief Justice also echoed the more archaic language of the 
Statute of Monopolies of 1623 through which the English 
Parliament struck back at the excesses of royal grants of 
exclusive privileges. While the Statute voided all such grants, it 
permitted patents for the “sole working or making[ ] of any 
manner of new[ ] Manufacture within this Realm[ ].”11 In other 
words, the exception Chief Justice Roberts identifies can be 
traced back to the 1624 voiding of monopolies granted by the 
crown, which created an exception for what would be described 
as utility patents.12 
Chief Justice Roberts does not cite the Statute of 
Monopolies, largely because it would be inapposite for the legal 
arguments in contention in Actavis. As a historical matter, the 
grant of power to Congress to create patent law in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution reflected the recognition 
that patent rights would be useful for society.13 However, the 
power to grant patents was created narrowly in terms of the 
purpose of the grant (to promote progress in the useful arts) 
                                                          
 10. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 11. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 5 (Eng.). 
 12. Id. § 6. 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
98 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:1 
 
and in the grant’s scope (limited Times, Inventors, Discoveries). 
The common law’s aversion to restraints on trade was 
recognized in the United States, and the case law before the 
enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890 does not suggest that 
patents were an exception to the common law.14 Instead, the 
Supreme Court recognized limitations on the patent owner’s 
rights to impose licensing restrictions based on the common 
law’s regulation of restrictions on competition.15 
While the exception identified by the Chief Justice may 
parallel the Statute of Monopolies, the patent exception does 
not reflect the law before the Sherman Act. The Court, for 
example, read into the Patent Act the first sale doctrine, whose 
parameters were shaped in a number of cases nearly twenty 
years before the Sherman Act.16 The first sale doctrine in 
patent law, or patent exhaustion, developed out of the scrutiny 
of restraints on alienation under the common law.17 Such 
scrutiny was consistent with the concern over state created 
monopolies, as evinced by the Court’s decisions in Gibbons v. 
Ogden and in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge. Given the 
Court’s extensive discussion about restraints on alienation and 
state-created monopolies throughout the nineteenth century 
before the enactment of the Sherman Act, the exception 
announced by the Chief Justice would be a relatively recent 
one. 
It is, however, doubtful that the exception even exists 
under the Sherman Act. To the extent that the Sherman Act 
was codifying a common law tradition, it is not the case that 
the exception articulated by the Chief Justice is a completely 
accurate statement of the status of patents under the Sherman 
                                                          
 14. See, e.g., Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. 289, 293 (1855) (applying 
restraint of trade analysis to a partnership involving joint patent ownership 
and not finding a restraint). For a general discussion of the period before the 
Sherman Act in the United States, see HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 47 (1954). 
 15. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 550–51 (1872). 
 16. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873). The Roberts Court affirmed 
this and other pre-Sherman Act precedents relating to patent law and 
competitive restraints in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. L.G. Electronics., Inc., 553 
U.S. 617 (2008), and most recently in Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 
1761 (2013). In the latter case, the Court affirmed not only patent exhaustion 
but also an established exception (although in my opinion incorrectly). See id. 
at 1766. 
 17. See Quanta, 533 U.S. at 625–28 (summarizing Supreme Court case 
law regarding the patent exhaustion doctrine). 
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Act. The Chief Justice states that patents would come under 
antitrust scrutiny in two cases.18 The first is the case of sham 
litigation, which arises when a patent infringement lawsuit is 
brought pretextually, masking an anticompetitive purpose.19 
The second is the case of fraud on the patent office, when the 
patent owner has obtained exclusive patent rights 
fraudulently.20 
These two situations do not exhaust the possibilities that 
exist under the Sherman Act for an antitrust-based challenge 
to a patent owner’s conduct in the marketplace.21 Patent 
exhaustion was recognized after the enactment of the Sherman 
Act. Although the Court did give the patent owner some leeway 
in how patent licenses are negotiated, the Court recognized 
that after the sale of the patented invention, patent rights were 
exhausted, leaving only contractual claims.22 As a species of 
contract, licensing provisions were not immunized from 
antitrust scrutiny.23 The discussion of the majority opinion 
below highlights these precedents. Put briefly, the presence of a 
patent did not immunize licensing agreements from the 
antitrust scrutiny of tying arrangements, cross-licensing, or 
patent pooling.24 The dissent simplifies a fairly complicated 
area into a pair of narrow rules. It would be a valid point that 
the antitrust scrutiny of the business practices of patent 
owners did not result in liability. But that result is a far cry 
from the characterization of a patent immunity from antitrust. 
The majority opinion poses a challenge to the dissenters to 
identify any statutory basis for a patent immunity from 
antitrust, either in the Patent Act, Sherman Act, Clayton Act, 
                                                          
 18. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2239 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 19. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993). 
 20. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 
U.S. 172, 177 (1965). 
 21. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (citing United States v. Line Material 
Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948)). 
 22. See, e.g., Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625 (“The longstanding doctrine of 
patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item 
terminates all patent rights to that item.”). 
 23. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2232 (“[T]he Court has struck down overly 
restrictive patent licensing agreements . . . .”). 
 24. See id. at 2231–34 (summarizing the Court’s historic treatment of 
patent issues under antitrust law). 
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or related provisions. Antitrust laws have no express or implied 
immunities for patents.25 The 1995 Department of 
Justice/Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for 
Intellectual Property Licensing make no reference to patent 
immunity.26 Furthermore, the conclusion that intellectual 
property licensing should fall under the rule of reason for 
antitrust analysis is consistent with this lack of immunity and 
with the majority’s ruling in Actavis. In his dissent, Chief 
Justice Roberts cites to neither antitrust statute nor guidelines. 
There are not even any citations to the Patent Act. Section 
271(d) exempts certain business practices from the defense of 
patent misuse.27 This statutory exemption would not support 
the broad immunity that the dissenters rely upon for their 
judgment. Furthermore, the language of section 271(d) was in 
part the basis for the Court’s 2006 ruling in Illinois Tool Works, 
Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.28 that ownership of a patent was 
not sufficient for the existence of market power, a big move 
away from per se rules of illegality for tying arrangements 
involving patents. The discussion of patents and antitrust in 
the 2006 ruling provided no basis for patent immunity from 
antitrust laws. 
Most importantly, the three dissenting judges ignore the 
Hatch-Waxman Act itself, which accords no immunity to patent 
holders and whose passage supports placing limitations on 
patent rights based on principles of competition policy. Enacted 
to overrule in part the Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co. Federal Circuit decision,29 the Hatch-
Waxman Act recognized the anticompetitive effects of patents 
on the entry of generic competition in the pharmaceutical 
                                                          
 25. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390–91 (1948) 
(finding that courts considering antitrust challenges against patent holders 
must “balance the privileges of [the patent holder] and its licensees under the 
patent grants with the prohibitions of the Sherman Act”). 
 26. See U.S. DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
 27. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (addressing the patent 
misuse doctrine). 
 28. 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (noting that Congress amended the Patent Act 
in 1988 to remove the market power presumption in patent misuse cases). 
 29. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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industry.30 The Court in Roche did adopt a position favorable to 
the patent owner by allowing owners of patented 
pharmaceuticals to enjoin generic drug manufacturers from 
engaging in experiments to prepare competing versions of the 
patented compound.31 Congress responded through the Hatch-
Waxman Act to provide a basis for generic competition. The 
Chief Justice’s opinion ignores the background to and the 
purpose of the Act in finding a strong immunity for patent from 
antitrust. In the dissent’s view, Congress created a mechanism 
for generic drug competition that could readily be trumped by 
the rights of the patent owner. Such immunity is in tension 
with the need for limitations on patent rights that generic 
competition would demand and that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
attempts to implement.32 
The broad patent immunity described in the dissent has no 
basis in precedent or in the patent or antitrust statutes. It is 
inconsistent with the Hatch-Waxman Act itself. Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion grounds the immunity in the contrasting goals 
of antitrust law and patent law. The former forbids 
anticompetitive behavior in order to promote consumer welfare. 
The latter allows limitations on competition in order to promote 
innovation. For the dissent, these two goals are inconsistent. 
The compromise is to limit antitrust law in situations where 
patent law can serve the goal of innovation, as presumably is 
the case with pharmaceuticals. These two allegedly divergent 
policies are identified in the secondary literature and are 
repeated throughout the opinion as incontrovertible. 
However, the dissent does not acknowledge that the goals 
of antitrust and patent law are complementary rather than 
antithetical. Competition and patent rights in innovative 
technologies can work in tandem to benefit consumers. Patent 
owners are not immunized from antitrust law as long as they 
are exercising their patent rights. Instead, business activities 
of the patent owner need to be policed by antitrust law to 
                                                          
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (“The purpose of Title I of the 
[Hatch-Waxman Act] is to make available more low cost generic drugs by 
establishing a generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs . . . .”). 
 31. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863 (finding that the generic producer’s 
experimentation infringed upon the patent). 
 32. See, e.g., Adam R. Young, Note, Generic Pharmaceutical Regulation in 
the United States with Comparison to Europe: Innovation and Competition, 8 
WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 165, 167–80 (2009). 
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ensure that markets for innovative technologies are, in fact, 
competitive. What the dissent misses, and the majority fails to 
contend with, is that competition is a spectrum of activities, not 
just part of a binary relationship with monopoly standing in 
contrast. The choice is not between pure competition and no 
competition, but in designing legal rules promoting the range of 
competitive activities that patent owners engage in. 
B. DISSECTING THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Like the dissent, the majority opinion can also be distilled 
into a simple proposition. As Justice Breyer states, even if the 
patent owner is operating within the legally recognized 
boundaries of the patent right, antitrust scrutiny can still 
apply.33 The five-judge majority opinion grounds this 
proposition in the Court’s precedent permitting antitrust suits 
to proceed against patent owners engaged in questionable 
patent pools and in exclusionary conduct aimed at preventing 
new entrants into the marketplace.34 The accommodation of 
patent and antitrust law occurs through the rule of reason 
standard.35 While the opinion addresses the FTC’s argument in 
support of a “quick look” rule of reason, one in which there 
would be a presumption of anti-competitive behavior 
potentially rebuttable by the patent owner, the majority rejects 
the truncated approach, citing its 2000 opinion in California 
Dental.36 Patent immunity is rejected, and rule of reason 
consequently is the legal standard, requiring a consideration of 
both anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications.37 
A central criticism of the rule of reason is that it is too 
open ended.38 Effectively, given litigation costs, the rule may 
serve to immunize patent owners from suit. In practice, the 
                                                          
 33. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013). 
 34. Id. (citing various cases in support of this proposition). 
 35. Id. at 2237 (finding that “the FTC must prove its case as in other rule-
of-reason cases” due to the complexities of patent settlement disputes). 
 36. Id. (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999)). 
 37. Id. at 2231 (“[I]t would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality 
by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent 
law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust 
policies as well.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and 
Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
733, 743–44 (2012) (describing problems with the open-ended approach within 
the rule of reason). 
2014] CONVERGENCE? 103 
 
rule of reason, unlike immunity, invites scrutiny but also 
requires fact-intensive analysis to find net effects that are anti-
competitive. Given the inherently qualitative dimensions of 
identifying anti-competitive effects, rule of reason would 
predictably result in little imposition of liability. The obvious 
open question is how the rule will be applied by litigants and 
assessed by courts. 
Justice Breyer’s opinion sets forth five anticompetitive 
concerns. Acknowledging that settlement has benefits, reverse 
payment settlements raise specific concerns under the 
antitrust law. Preventing entry of new firms is anticompetitive 
and is not justified in the scenario of generic drug entry.39 
Presumably, in the case of patented pharmaceuticals, the main 
purpose of patent law to incentivize invention of a new 
compound has been realized. The issue is how intensively and 
extensively the invention can be marketed by the patent owner. 
Since there are consumer benefits to generic entry, the 
justification for preventing such entry is far from clear. 
Furthermore, given the size of the companies and the 
concentrated markets for pharmaceuticals, patent owners are 
in a position to bring about the potential anticompetitive effects 
from preempted entry.40 Antitrust scrutiny is possible and, 
Justice Breyer asserts, is administrable to limit the business 
practices of patent owners.41 Finally, alternative forms of 
settlement exist that do not involve reverse payments and the 
highly likely division of the market that such reverse payment 
settlements entail.42 
Read in the narrowest possible way, the holding of Actavis 
applies only to reverse payment settlements. Read as a 
rejection of the position espoused by the dissent, the Actavis 
decision opens up all business decisions by patent owners to 
rule of reason analysis through the denial of any immunity 
based in patent rights. A frustration with Justice Breyer’s 
opinion is the ambiguity with which he writes. He starts the 
opinion with a reference to Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.43 as 
standing for the illegality of agreements not to compete.44 This 
                                                          
 39. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–36. 
 40. Id. at 2236. 
 41. Id. at 2236–37. 
 42. Id. at 2237. 
 43. 498 U.S. 46, 48 (1990). 
 44. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227 (citing Palmer, 498 U.S. at 46). 
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broad holding is echoed in a citation to Verizon v. Trinko for the 
proposition that “collusion” is “the supreme evil of antitrust.”45 
Such language suggests that the majority had a broad holding 
in mind. But the majority opinion always returned back from 
such broad language to the specific facts of the case. Common 
law reasoning was at work, and the analysis provides a 
framework that addresses the case at hand but also leaves 
open application to other situations. 
What keeps the opinion from perhaps being a great one is 
that there was no consideration of the competing policies with 
an attempt to reconcile them. While the dissent takes for 
granted the opposing policies of patent and antitrust, the 
majority states that this tension is an assumption rather than 
a reasoned conclusion. But the majority is equally facile in 
asserting that competition policies apply to patent owners 
despite arguments in support of the contrary, such as the 
Statute of Monopolies. There is no attempt to deal with the 
treatment of patents under common law rules against restraint 
of trade. There is no engagement with the case law on patents 
and monopoly before the Sherman Act. There is no discussion 
of the meaning of competition and the economic, political, and 
social policies that support competition norms. Of course, all 
that discussion may be the substance of scholarly articles 
rather than judicial opinions. But such policy engagement 
would have been interesting to read and perhaps even 
enlightening. 
Arguably, we saw an example of such policy analysis in 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,46 the other big case from 
the 2012 Supreme Court Term dealing with intellectual 
property and competition. At issue in that case was the right of 
a copyright owner to prevent resale of an imported, copyrighted 
work.47 Previous confrontations of the issue resulted in split 
courts struggling over the literal meaning of the statute.48 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 2233 (citing Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 47. Id. at 1355. 
 48. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies of copyrighted 
works manufactured outside of the United States); Omega S.A. v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the first sale 
doctrine applies only to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made in the 
United States). 
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Some light appeared as the Justices ventured into the policies 
and consequences of different statutory readings. Engaging in a 
pragmatic form of common law reasoning, the Court reached 
the result of limiting the rights of copyright owners by 
expanding the first sale doctrine.49 Arguably the Court was 
concerned, in part, with what the impact of a contrary ruling 
might be on free trade and the well-being of consumers.50 
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Actavis, much like his majority 
opinion in Kirtsaeng, engaged with the consequences of 
allowing reverse payment settlements. But the engagement is 
limited to the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the 
identified goal of promoting generic competition. The holding of 
Kirtsaeng is a broad one that cuts across different markets and 
industries. By contrast, the holding’s reach in Actavis is more 
limited. The Court identified an overlap between patent and 
antitrust law and clearly rejected the separation of the 
statutory schemes of patent and antitrust accepted by the 
dissent. But it failed to explain how the situation of generic 
drug competition might generalize to other situations where 
patent owners may be acting anti-competitively. Does the 
Court’s adoption of the rule of reason apply to all business 
practices by patent owners, or is it limited to the Hatch-
Waxman context? To answer that question, one would need to 
develop a theory of how antitrust and patent laws converge. I 
conclude my comments with a sketch of what such a theory 
might look like and implications for intellectual property law 
beyond the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
II. IDENTIFYING CONVERGENCE 
Two policy questions arise in the controversy over reverse 
payment settlements. The first is the question of the 
relationship between intellectual property and competition. 
The second is whether business practices involving patents 
should give rise to antitrust scrutiny. The Court in Actavis is 
concerned with the second, much narrower question, with its 
implications for judicial administrability, litigation threats for 
private parties, and availability of adequate remedies. 
Understandably, the Court’s attention turns to the second, 
                                                          
 49. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358. 
 50. Id. at 1364–67. 
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narrower and more justiciable question. But a satisfactory 
answer requires some engagement with the first. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent assumes an answer to the 
first, namely that patent law’s concern is with innovation, not 
competition. This assumption is never explained. Presumably, 
it reflects the view that antitrust law deals with the market 
conditions for a competitive price while patent law deals with 
the conditions for the creation and commercialization of new 
technologies. While academic scholarship supports this view, it 
may also be justified by the two separate statutory schemes 
that Congress has adopted for antitrust and for patent. 
But academic scholars do not all readily accept a 
distinction between competition and innovation.51 The latter is 
a form of competition that takes place with respect to an 
economic variable other than price: perhaps quality, perhaps 
technological improvement. Economist Kenneth Arrow 
famously argued that at least with respect to cost-saving 
technologies, competitive markets would provide more 
incentives to innovate than monopolized ones.52 Professor 
Arrow was considering the case in which the innovative firm 
develops technology that lowers its costs and potentially those 
of other firms in the industry. His analysis would be different if 
the technological innovation would permit product 
differentiation. However, competition may foster innovation 
better than strong exclusivity even in the case of technology-
induced product differentiation. Professor Arrow’s argument 
suggests that competitive conditions matter for innovation. Put 
another way, antitrust and patent laws may reside in separate 
provisions of the United States Code, but they are not 
independent of each other. 
Justice Breyer’s majority decision recognizes this 
interdependence. Unfortunately, the majority opinion also fails 
to engage the first question of how intellectual property relates 
to competition. Like the dissenters, the majority does not 
                                                          
 51. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION 
MACHINE 93 (2002); MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2009); 
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21–22 (1970). 
 52. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Innovation, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 
ed., 1962). 
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engage with the pre-Sherman Act case law in which concerns 
with competition informed the application of patent law, such 
as the cases involving patent exhaustion and other areas of 
patent licensing.53 These cases are not anti-patent by any 
means. Patent owners did not inevitably and predictably lose 
once under scrutiny from competition policy. Instead, what 
these pre-1890 cases teach is that patent law is developed and 
applied with considerations of competition issues and concerns 
that the scope of the patent right might be construed in ways 
that would be anticompetitive. The underlying conviction is 
arguably that market competition drives innovation, and 
patent law should be applied with that principle in mind. 
The difficulty is that with the enactment of the Sherman 
Act, the search for the correct model of market competition 
drives the legal and policy analysis of antitrust. If the ideal is 
one of perfect price competition, then the model of a patent 
owner licensing access to the market for an innovative 
technology is antithetical to the goals of antitrust laws. But 
these contrasting idealized models are not representative 
either of the type of competition antitrust law tries to protect or 
of the way in which innovation occurs. Firms compete on 
variables other than price and in market settings where there 
might be a concentration of firms, contra the idealized perfect 
competition model. Antitrust law functions within these 
market settings as well. Furthermore, patent owners face 
competition from other innovators who have created substitute 
technologies and from design-around by unwilling licensees. 
The competitive norms of antitrust and patent are not as stark 
and contrasting as one might first think. Unfortunately, the 
Actavis Court does not engage with these points. 
This lack of engagement is surprising given the Court’s 
2006 decision in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, 
Inc., in which the Court unanimously ruled that patent 
ownership does not create a presumption of market power.54 
Logically, if one accepts that proposition, then patent 
ownership could in principle be consistent with competitive 
markets, and would be one factor to consider in the broader 
competitive analysis of antitrust. Justice Stevens wrote the 
majority opinion in Independent Ink, signed on to by the three 
                                                          
 53. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 54. 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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dissenters in Actavis and three of the five justices who signed 
onto the Actavis majority.55 
Are the dissenters being inconsistent? One way to reconcile 
the contrasting positions of Justices Roberts, Scalia, and 
Thomas is that in both Independent Ink and Actavis, the three 
are urging a strong separation between patent and antitrust. 
In Independent Ink, patent ownership alone cannot buttress 
the antitrust claim. The three may even go so far as to suggest 
patent ownership has no bearing on the antitrust analysis. By 
contrast, the three justices in the majority for both Independent 
Ink and Actavis would most likely reason that patent 
ownership might have some bearing on the competitiveness 
analysis. How much, we can only speculate. It would be 
interesting to see what type of opinion Justice Stevens would 
have written in Actavis. His keen eye on the shared goals of 
competition in antitrust law and patent law was shown in his 
Independent Ink decision and came out in the failed majority 
opinion (but strong concurrence) he penned for Bilski v. 
Kappos, the 2010 decision about the patentability of business 
method patents.56 
One may finish reading the Actavis opinions, and this 
Comment, with the unsettling feeling that there is just an 
ideological divide among the Justices with some being pro-
patent and others being pro-antitrust. Of course, that reading 
would be frustrating and would, I think erroneously, accept the 
very divide between patent and antitrust assumed by the three 
dissenters. 
What might be more helpful is to understand the divisions 
among the Justices in terms of deference to Congress. The 
dissenters view the antitrust statutes and the patent act as 
having independent significance. Each is a separate enactment 
by Congress, aimed at distinct policies. As I have suggested, 
this position ignores the historical developments of the two 
statutory schemes since the Statute of Monopolies, and 
specifically the treatment of patents before the enactment of 
the Sherman Act. As pointed out above, the 1623 Statute itself 
carved out an exception for patents of invention from the 
prohibition against monopoly grants. I do not see evidence that 
                                                          
 55. Justice Sotomayor replaced Justice Souter, and Justice Alito recused 
himself in both Independent Ink and Actavis. 
 56. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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the Chief Justice took a cue from this 1623 enactment in 
writing his dissent, although the earlier pronouncement does 
resonate in the 2013 opinion. My sense is that the Chief Justice 
is looking at what contemporary Congress has done and does 
not see evidence of overlap between the two statutory schemes. 
The majority, I would argue, also is showing deference to 
Congress, but its deference is to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 
heart of the controversy in reverse payment settlement 
disputes. Justice Breyer confronts this statutory scheme 
directly and concludes that reverse payment settlements 
subvert the goals of the scheme to promote the entry of generic 
competition. The remedy he proposes is found in antitrust law. 
As many critics of the Actavis decision have pointed out, the 
ideal remedy would be to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
implement a more effective means of promoting generic 
competition. But that remedy is not available to a Supreme 
Court Justice. Instead, what the majority does is identify two 
conflicting legislative schemes, that of separate patent and 
antitrust statutes, and that of Hatch-Waxman, which 
intertwines patent and antitrust law. Instead of deferring to 
the first, as the dissenters do, the majority deferred to the goals 
of the second by allowing an antitrust claim to serve as a basis 
for reviewing settlements that deter generic competition. How 
far this review will go is for the lower courts to determine, 
possibly with the Supreme Court offering guidance in the 
distant future. The majority, however, does not pronounce a 
convergence of antitrust and patent law under the canopy of 
competition law and policy. Instead, the court seeks to 
implement its understanding of Congress’ vision of competition 
as enacted in the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
What supports deference to Congress as the key to 
understanding Actavis is the striking citation to the Court’s 
unanimous decision in Verizon v. Trinko, from 2004.57 Justice 
Breyer cites the case for the proposition that collusion is an evil 
that antitrust law combats.58 This quote is odd because Trinko 
was not about collusion; it was a monopolization case. 
Furthermore, it was a case in which the Court unanimously 
agreed that no antitrust claim could be brought, because of 
                                                          
 57. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 408 (2004); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 58. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013). 
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Congress’ scheme for deregulating (really reregulating) the 
telecommunications industry. Justice Scalia, writing for the 
Court,59 famously stated that antitrust law “does not give 
judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of 
doing business whenever some other approach might yield 
greater competition.”60 
Justice Breyer signed on to Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Trinko and might be accused of exercising such carte blanche in 
Actavis. Actually, Justice Breyer, through his majority opinion, 
is doing precisely what Justice Scalia was urging in Trinko: 
deferring to a Congressional scheme for competition. Arguably, 
it is Chief Justice Roberts and his fellow dissenters who are 
engaging in judicial carte blanche by ignoring Congress’s goals 
in the Hatch-Waxman Act. But I would hold all the Justices 
guilty for not better engaging in how both antitrust and patent 
laws serve the goals of competitive markets. 
A comparison with the approach to reverse payment 
settlements in the European Union is instructive. A few days 
after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Actavis, the 
European Competition Commission levied a substantial fine 
against the Danish company Lundbeck for engaging in 
anticompetitive reverse payment settlements with generic drug 
companies. In its press release, the Commission pronounced 
what is tantamount to a per se rule: 
But instead of competing, the generic producers agreed with 
Lundbeck in 2002 not to enter the market in return for substantial 
payments and other inducements from Lundbeck amounting to tens 
of millions of euros. Internal documents refer to a “club” being 
formed and “a pile of $$$” to be shared among the participants. 
Lundbeck paid significant lump sums, purchased generics’ stock for 
the sole purpose of destroying it, and offered guaranteed profits in a 
distribution agreement. The agreements gave Lundbeck the 
certainty that the generics producers would stay out of the market 
for the duration of the agreements without giving the generic 
producers any guarantee of market entry thereafter. These 
agreements are very different from other settlements of patent 
                                                          
 59. Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Souter concurred as to the judgment, 
but reasoned that the case should be dismissed for lack of standing by Trinko, 
who was not an actual competitor of Verizon and therefore was not injured. 
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 416–18 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 415 (majority opinion). 
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disputes where generic companies are not simply paid off to stay out 
of the market.61 
The Commission based its decision on general principles of 
competition policy and the dynamics of the pharmaceutical 
market in Europe.62 While the European Parliament has not 
adopted legislation similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 
member states of the European Union use price controls to 
regulate the pharmaceutical sector63 and allow generic 
competition through hybrid forms of identified compounds.64 In 
addition, parallel importation from one member nation to 
another permits competition in the pharmaceutical industry.65 
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis does not 
appeal to general competition principles and does not open up 
broad antitrust scrutiny of agreements of patents. Instead, the 
majority is inviting scrutiny of reverse patent settlements that 
are inconsistent with the model of generic competition provided 
by the Hatch-Waxman Act. Hence my conclusion that what 
underlies the Actavis decision is deference to Congressional 
judgments. 
A more optimistic reading of the Actavis opinion is that it 
invites antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason for all 
agreements involving patents, whether patent licenses, 
assignments, or settlements. Peter Carstensen, an anointed 
                                                          
 61. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Lundbeck 
and Other Pharma Companies for Delaying Market Entry of Generic 
Medicines 1 (June 19, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-563_en.htm?locale=en. Lundbeck was fined €93.8 million, with 
several generic medicine producers fined a total of €52.2 million. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Young, supra note 32, at 180–83. 
 64. See id. at 184 (describing use of generic substitutes). Allowing 
substitutes for patented compounds, known as hybrid compounds, is permitted 
under the European Union directive regulating pharmaceuticals. Article 10(3) 
of the directive defines hybrid compounds and Article 10(6) excludes them 
from patentability. See Directive 2001/83/EC, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code Relating to 
Medicinal Products for Human Use 2001/83/EC, arts. 10(3), 10(6), 2004 O.J. (L 
311) 67; see also Generic/Hybrid Applications: Questions and Answers, EUR. 
MEDICINES AGENCY, http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/
regulation/general/general_content_000179.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac0580022717 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (providing general information on generic and 
hybrid applications in Europe). 
 65. See Parallel Imports of Proprietary Medicinal Products, EUROPA.EU, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_for_go
ods/pharmaceutical_and_cosmetic_products/l23110_en.htm (last updated June 
10, 2005). 
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distinguished professor who has published about twenty-nine 
articles over forty years of being a professor at Wisconsin Law 
School according to the School’s own searchable bibliography, 
pronounced to me that out of Justice Breyer’s opinion may 
bloom an ancillary restraint doctrine for the intersection of 
patent and antitrust. As I understand his point, the Actavis 
decision may be a re-articulation of the rule of reason adopted 
by the Supreme Court in its 1899 decision, Addyston Pipe & 
Steel Co. v. United States.66 In that case, the Court scrutinized 
an agreement among competitors to raise the price of steel in 
order to avoid a ruinous price war. The Court found this was 
impermissible under the rule of reason because of the 
unreasonable market harm caused by the increased price.67 
The Court, however, did not adopt the ancillary restraint 
doctrine used by Judge Taft in his opinion for the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.68 Under the ancillary 
restraint doctrine, an agreement among competitors is illegal 
unless it is ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract or 
it is necessary to protect the enjoyment of legitimate fruits 
from an enterprise or to prevent injury.69 Without doing harm 
to Professor Carstensen’s position,70 I understand his point to 
be that the rule of reason in Actavis may serve to promote 
scrutiny of the conduct of patent owners, especially if modeled 
on the ancillary restraint doctrine. 
We can only see how future courts apply Actavis to see if 
the ancillary restraint doctrine comes into its own or if 
deference to the legislatively-prescribed terms of generic 
competition prevails. What I am confident of is that the 
dissent’s narrow view of the relationship between patent and 
antitrust law has been rejected. We are, however, far away 
from their convergence. 
                                                          
 66. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 67. Id. at 234–35. 
 68. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
 69. Id. at 282. 
 70. Although the comments discussed in this text are derived from oral 
conversation, a published account of Miller Professor Carstensen’s over-the-
top thinking of the ancillary restraint doctrine, which may be alienating to 
some, can be found in Peter Carstensen, Post-Sale Restraints Via Patent 
Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 1053, 1054–55 (2006). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
A friend made the following comment to me about two 
recent Supreme Court cases relating to intellectual property: “I 
guess you must have liked the Myriad decision71 and disliked 
the Bowman decision.”72 My response was that I liked the 
Bowman decision because it could have been worse and 
disliked the Myriad decision because it could have been better. 
If he had asked about the Actavis decision, my response would 
have been that it came out just like I expected it would. 
Antitrust law poses a facile choice for judges: per se illegality or 
rule of reason. There may be some room for nuance, but only a 
little. More engagement with the policies underlying 
competition would be desirable. Instead, those thinking about 
antitrust engage with models of markets that may provide 
some guidance but lead invariably to the rule of reason. 
Ultimately, in my opinion, the best way to realize effective 
competition policy in intellectual property is more targeted 
intellectual property doctrines. The prize for most important 
case about intellectual property and competition policy during 
the 2012 Supreme Court term goes not to Actavis, but to 
Kirtsaeng. 
 
                                                          
 71. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2120 (2013) (invalidating patents on naturally occurring DNA 
sequences). 
 72. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768–69 (2013) (holding 
that patent exhaustion does not permit making another copy of a patented 
seed germplasm). 
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